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Abstract
Recently the United States Supreme Court was called upon to determine
the size of the fourth amendment umbrella. In Oliver v. United
States,’ the Court was asked whether a search warrant was required,
”for the search of a highly secluded field from which the public is excluded
when a reasonable expectation of privacy can be shown to exist
in that field.
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I. Introduction
Recently the United States Supreme Court was called upon to de-
termine the size of the fourth amendment umbrella. In Oliver v. United
States,' the Court was asked whether a search warrant was required,
"for the search of a highly secluded field from which the public is ex-
cluded when a reasonable expectation of privacy can be shown to exist
in that field."' By granting the writ of certiorari, the Court agreed to
settle a question which has plagued lower courts for over fifteen years.
In order to understand the Supreme Court's decision in Oliver, this
comment will begin with a cursory glance at the origin of the fourth
amendment. 3 The evolution of the "open fields" doctrine4 as developed
in five landmark decisions: Hester v. United States,5 Olnstead v.
United States,6 Katz v. United States,' Air Pollution Variance Board
v. Western Alfalfa Corporation,8 and Marshall v. Barlow's Inc. will be
1. -U.S.-, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
2. Brief for Petitioner Ray E. Oliver, Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735
(1984).
3.
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), is generally recognized as the
case responsible for the creation of the "open fields" doctrine. The Court held "the
special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons,
houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. Therefore, if a search is
conducted in an open field, the courts will not apply fourth amendment protection from
unreasonable search and seizure and any evidence obtained as a result of this warrant-
less search will be admissible at trial.
5. id.
6. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
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reviewed. 9 This comment will focus on the analysis employed, as well
as that not employed, by the Court in Oliver. In conclusion, this com-
ment will examine the Court's decision in light of the constant tension
which exists between effective law enforcement and an individual's
right to be free from governmental intrusion.
II. Origin of the Fourth Amendment
Just as American attention is currently focused on volatile issues
such as protecting the environment, preventing the occurrence of a nu-
clear disaster, and reducing the national debt, so were there issues in
the latter half of the eighteenth century which were of equal impor-
tance to the people of this country. 10 One issue more compelling and
immediate than any other in the eighteenth century was America's de-
termination to be free from the dictates of the British Government."
One particularly loathsome practice of the British was the use of writs
of assistance, a device considered to be a major cause of the American
Revolution, and also credited with inspiring the Framers to include the
fourth amendment in the Bill of Rights.'" The British, by utilizing a
procedure known as a writ of assistance, were able to subject the colo-
nists to search and seizures without first showing probable cause.' 3 The
Framers, keenly aware of the abuses a government could subject its
people to, constructed the fourth amendment with an aim to prevent
the new American government from continuing the British practice of
warrantless searches.' 4 As Justice Field explained in his discussion of
the fourth amendment, it is essential to the peace of mind of every
American citizen that he have confidence in his government to protect
his right to keep his private affairs beyond the scrutiny of others.' 5 In
9. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
10. See generally, N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT To THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1937).
11. Id. at 58-9.
12. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886). For an analysis of this
historic decision, see Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1866-1976),
76 MICH. L. REV. 184 (1977).
13. In Boyd, the Court explained that writs of assistance "authorized the exami-
nation of ships and vessels, and persons found therein, for the purpose of finding goods
prohibited to be imported or exported, or on which the duties were not paid; and to
enter into and search any suspected vaults, cellars, or warehouses for such goods."
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623.
14. Id. at 623-30.
15. In Re Pacific R.R. Comm', 32 F. 241, 250 (1887).
[Vol. 9
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/9
Oliver v. United States
the decades which followed, the courts struggled to determine the
bounds of fourth amendment protection from unreasonable search and
seizures.'" Although that struggle began over 200 years ago, courts
continue to wrestle with issues that require them to balance the de-
mands of effective law enforcement against the preservation of personal
liberties.
III. The Evolution of the "Open Fields" Doctrine
The open fields doctrine evolved as a result of one of the Supreme
Court's endeavors to determine the extent of fourth amendment protec-
tion. Hester v. United States 7 is the case generally recognized as the
source of this doctrine. The open fields doctrine asserts that the fourth
amendment does not protect activities which take place in the open
fields, i.e. grasslands, ranges, cow pastures or woods.',
In Hester, revenue agents hiding on Hester's father's land, saw
Hester hand a bottle to a man named Henderson.'" When a warning
was given Hester took a gallon jug from a nearby car and he and Hen-
derson ran.20 The officers followed and a pistol was fired.2' The jug
carried by Hester was dropped and the one by Henderson discarded.2
The officers retrieved the discarded bottle and jug which had contained
Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security,
and that involves, not merely protection of his person from assault, but
exemption of his private affairs, books, papers, from the inspection and
scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all other rights
would lose half their value.
16. The continuous development in this area of the law is evidenced by the long
evolution of the "exclusionary rule." E.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) (origin of the exclusionary rule which held evidence seized in violation of a
person's fourth amendment rights can not be used against that person in federal court);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the Court determined the exclusionary rule ap-
plied to the states via the fourteenth amendment); United States v. Leon, -U.S.-,
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not bar the use
of evidence obtained in reasonable reliance on a defective search warrant).
17. Hester, 265 U.S. at 57.
18. An open field is defined as "any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of
the curtilage. An open field need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used
in common speech." Oliver, - U.S. at ._ 104 S. Ct. at 1742, n.1 1.
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illicitly distilled moonshine whisky.23 Since a warrant for search or ar-
rest had not been obtained by the revenue officers, Hester claimed that
the police violated his constitutional rights under the fourth amend-
ment.24 Justice Holmes, in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated
that "the special protection accorded by the fourth amendment to the
people in their 'persons, houses, papers and effects,' is not extended to
the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as
old as the common law."'2 5 The Court noted that even though the reve-
nue officers had committed a technical trespass, the fourth amendment
protection did not extend to the area referred to as the open field since
Hester's own acts had disclosed the evidence." In essence, Hester
stands for the proposition that government agents can trespass on prop-
erty from which the public was not excluded during a warrantless
search, and without violating the fourth amendment, could view that
which was exposed to the public.2
Three years later in Olmstead v. United States,2 the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the tapping of telephone wires by
federal officers constituted an illegal search and seizure. 9 The govern-
ment submitted recorded conversations as evidence to prove the defen-
dants had engaged in activities prohibited by the National Prohibition
Act. A closely divided Court determined that there could not be a vio-
lation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights, "unless there has been
an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his
papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of
his house 'or curtilage' 0 for the purpose of making a seizure." 3' 1 The
significant point of the Court's analysis is that certain areas are to be
considered "constitutionally protected" and unless a search and seizure
23. Id.
24. Id. at 57-8.
25. Id. at 59.
26. Id. at 58.
27. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 363 (6th Cir. 1982) (Keith, J.,
dissenting).
28. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438.
29. The wire taps were not done on the property belonging to the defendants. Id.
at 457.
30. Curtilage is a common-law term which describes buildings subject to bur-
glary. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 712-13 (1972). Curtilage is de-
fined as "the inclosed space of ground and buildings immediately surrounding a dwel-
linghouse." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (5th ed. 1979).
31. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
[Vol. 9
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took place within those specified areas, the fourth amendment could not
be invoked. 32 This decision made actual physical intrusion into the de-
fendant's house or within the curtilage a prerequisite to a fourth
amendment defense.3 3 For many decades, Olmstead's per se rule al-
lowed law enforcement personnel to conduct arbitrary warrantless
searches of the area beyond the curtilage. This locational approach to
defining the reach of the fourth amendment became the subject of criti-
cism 34 and was eventually overruled in Katz v. United States.3 5
Katz is credited with dramatically altering fourth amendment
analysis employed in determining whether an illegal search and seizure
took place. In Katz, the defendant was convicted for transmitting ille-
gal gambling information from a public phone booth. 6 The government
introduced evidence of these conversations, overheard by F.B.I. agents
who had placed electronic listening and recording devices on the
outside of a telephone booth.37 The Supreme Court held that Katz's
fourth amendment rights had indeed been violated because the govern-
ment had invaded an area in which Katz had a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 38 The Court rejected the locational approach to fourth
amendment protection employed in Olmstead.39 Instead, the Court de-
termined that the focus of the application of fourth amendment protec-
tion centers on one's right of privacy. 40 The Court held, that the
"fourth amendment protects people, not places. What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office is not a
subject of fourth amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitution-
ally protected.'
The Court concluded that the common-law property concepts of
32. Id. at 466.
33. Id.
34. E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (the Court held that
conversations can be the subject of fourth amendment violations even without a techni-
cal trespass); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (the Court refused to restrict
the concept of unlawful search and seizures to the limitations of common-law property
rights and held the spirit of the fourth amendment was to protect the privacy rights of
individuals).
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
36. Id. at 348.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 353.
39. Id. at 352-53.
40. Id. at 353.
41. Id. at 351.
"2351984]
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trespass and curtilage were to be considered only as factors in deter-
mining if a fourth amendment violation had taken place.42 Writing for
the majority, Justice Stewart stated that the activities of the F.B.I. had
indeed "violated the privacy upon which . . .[Katz] had justifiably re-
lied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and
seizure' within the meaning of the fourth amendment. '43 The Court
then had to determine whether the governmental activities met with
constitutional standards.44 Failure of the officers in Katz to obtain the
approval of a neutral magistrate, prompted the Court to clarify its pol-
icy on the warrant requirement. The Court viewed the warrant require-
ment as a necessary safeguard to assure that independent judicial re-
view determines whether there is probable cause to issue a search
warrant.45 Acknowledging that the officers believed that their activities
would produce evidence of a particular crime and that they carried out
their investigation by utilizing the least intrusive means, the Court,
nevertheless, held the warrantless search to be unlawful.46 The Court
concluded, "that searches conducted outside the judicial process, with-
out prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the fourth amendment-subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well delineated exceptions. 47
Another major contribution of Katz to fourth amendment analysis
was the two-pronged test set forth in Justice Harlan's concurring opin-
ion. Designed to further define the standard of review applicable in de-
termining when the fourth amendment's protections should be ex-
tended, the test requires: "first that a person have exhibited an actual
42. Id. at 353.
43. id.
44. Id. at 354.
45. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) which contains Justice Jackson's
classic explanation of the rationale behind the fourth amendment warrant requirement:
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. ...
When the right to privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,
as a rule, to be decided by judicial officer, not by a policeman or govern-
ment enforcement agent.
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
46. Warrantless searches have been considered unlawful regardless of probable
cause. See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
[Vol. 9
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(subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "48 That this
test was readily adopted by courts throughout the country and, is in
fact frequently quoted in other Supreme Court majority opinions, per-
haps accounts for the particularly powerful impact of Justice Harlan's
concurrence.
The next major case to amplify the Court's application and inter-
pretation of the "open fields" doctrine was Air Pollution Variance
Board v. Western Alfalfa Corporations.49 A State Board of Health In-
spector entered the outdoor premises of the defendant's business, from
which the public was not excluded, and conducted visual pollution
tests.5" The evidence obtained from this daylight test proved that the
emissions from the business' chimneys violated state statutes.5' The
business claimed that the inspector's failure to obtain either a search
warrant or the consent of the owners violated its fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches. 52 The Court observed that
the inspector did not enter the plant or offices, and in fact had "sighted
what anyone in the city who was near the plant would see in the
sky-plumes of smoke." 53 Justice Douglas then noted the Hester deci-
sion and Justice Holmes' refusal to "extend the fourth amendment to
sights seen 'in the open field.' "-5 In essence, the Court held that it did
not constitute an illegal search and seizure, within the meaning of the
fourth amendment, for a government agent to trespass upon land from
which the public is not excluded and to submit as evidence anything
exposed to the public view. 55
Justice Douglas did not clarify whether the decision would have
been different, had the inspector entered land in which the owners had
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet the Court's emphasis
on the fact that the inspector was on premises open to the public, ar-
guably implies that this fact affected the Court's conclusion.56 Also
noteworthy is the language chosen by Justice Douglas in quoting the
Hester decision. Douglas speaks of Holmes' refusal to extend constitu-
48. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. Air Pollution Variance Board, 416 U.S. at 861.
50. Id. at 862-63.
51. Id. at 863-64.
52. Id. at 864.
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tional protection to "sights seen 'in the open field.' -5 This language
will be significant in the later examination of Oliver since in that case
the police had to trespass on highly secluded, fenced and posted land
before they were in a position to view the sights seen in that so called
"open field." 58
The Supreme Court refined the definition of a permissible war-
rantless search in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.59 In Marshall, a business-
man refused to allow a warrantless search by an Occupational Safety
and Health Administration inspector who was looking for safety
hazards and regulatory violations.60 The Court upheld the district
court's decision, which held that statutory authorization for warrantless
searches were unconstitutional.61The Court determined that a govern-
ment inspector "[w]ithout a warrant stands in no better position than a
member of the public. What is observable by the public is observable,
without a warrant, by the government inspection as well."62 At this
phase of evolution the open fields doctrine appeared to relegate a gov-
ernment agent, minus a search warrant, to exactly the same position as
any other member of the public.
In order to clarify the case law development of the open fields doc-
trine under the fourth amendment, the following is a brief summary of
the previously discussed cases:
1. Hester (1924): Fourth amendment protection does not extend to
the open fields.13
2. Olmstead (1928): Actual physical intrusion into the house or sur-
rounding curtilage is required before one's fourth amendment rights
could be violated.64
3. Katz (1967): a. This is a shift from the locational approach of
Olmstead, to the reasonable expectation of privacy test: "Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."6 5
b. Harlan's test for determining whether the privacy expectation
is reasonable "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
57. Id.
58. Oliver, 686 F.2d at 358.
59. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 307.
60. Id. at 310.
61. Id. at 325.
62. Id. at 315.
63. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
64. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
65. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
[Vol. 9
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society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "6
c. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth
amendment (subject to a few exceptions).67
4. Air Pollution (1974): Warrantless searches are permitted in areas
from which the public is not excluded.68
5. Marshall (1978): Without a warrant a government official is in no
better position than any other member of the public and conversely
anything exposed to the public is observable by the police.69
The years between 1924, when Justice Holmes first articulated the
"open fields" doctrine in Hester, and 1978 when the Court issued its
ruling in Marshall, produced many changes in the doctrine. A consid-
erable amount of confusion resulted from this evolutionary process and
courts were uncertain whether Hester remained viable in light of Katz.
This is evidenced by the varied interpretations and applications of the
open fields doctrine in courts throughout the country. Many courts al-
lowed warrantless searches only of areas from which the public was not
excluded and where a reasonable expectation of privacy, as measured
by the two-prong test, was absent.7" This method of application of the
open fields doctrine, constituted a rejection of the per se approach of
Hester, and an adoption of the reasonable expectation of privacy test
developed in Katz. Other courts, however, continued to apply the loca-
tional analysis of the Olmstead decision to the holding in Hester.
Under this latter view, the area labeled as the open field was beyond
the zone of fourth amendment protection or outside of the constitution-
66. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 357.
68. Air Pollution Variance Board, 416 U.S. at 865.
69. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 315.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982), where the
court referred to the "Hester-Katz rationale" as determinative in cases involving the
"open fields" doctrine. This combined rationale considers activities observable by the
general public to be observable by government agents without a warrant, and con-
versely, that which is excluded from public view can not be used as evidence by the
police without a warrant; see also United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.
1981) (government agents observed illegal aliens working in fenced scrap metal yard);
United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (court rejected a
per se approach to the "open fields" doctrine and held a reasonable expectation of
privacy, Justice Harlan's two-pronged test, to be controlling); United States v. Swart,
679 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1982) (The analysis used in Katz, prohibits a rule deter-
mining an activity which takes place a particular distance from the house or curtilage
to be, as a matter of law, denied fourth amendment protection).
1984]
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ally protected areas.71 Due to the uncertainty concerning the scope of
the open fields doctrine in the wake of Katz, the Supreme Court
granted the writ of certioari in Oliver.72
IV. Statement of the Case
Without the aid of a clear ruling from the Supreme Court, lower
courts have been required to determine on their own if and when the
open fields doctrine applies as a viable exception to the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement. The divergent lower court holdings of
United States v. Oliver73 and State v. Thornton7 4 are representative of
the problem which has existed in courts across the country. The prob-
lem is dramatically underscored by the contrary decisions reached in
these two cases which possess almost identical facts.75 The question
presented in each of these cases was whether the open fields doctrine
allows government agents to trespass upon and search for marijuana
fields without a warrant, where the fields are secluded, surrounded by
no trespassing signs and clearly exhibit the landowner's subjective ex-
71. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1982) (en banc)
(the Court held that Hester applied to a field that was fenced and posted); United
States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979)
(Hester still considered viable in light of Katz analysis); Ford v. State, 264 Ark. 141,
569 S.W.2d 105 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979) (applied "open fields" doc-
trine to posted land which was fenced and had a locked gate).
72. The inconsistency which resulted from different interpretations and applica-
tions of the "open fields" doctrine prompted the Supreme Court to first grant certioari
in State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1981), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 988 (1982),
cert. dismissed in part, vacated in part - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984). In Brady,
the Florida Supreme Court determined that the fourth amendment prohibited applica-
tion of the "open fields" doctrine when contraband was seized in a warrantless search
of land posted, surrounded by barbed wire, and secured by locked gates. However, due
to procedural difficulties, the viability of the case became questionable. This comment
assumes the Court granted the writ of certiorari in Oliver as a result of these proce-
dural developments in Brady.
73. Oliver, 686 F.2d at 356. For an analysis of this 5 to 4 decision see, Glickman,
Katz In Open Fields, 20 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 485, 497 (1983), and Gibson, How
Open Are Open Fields? United States v. Oliver, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 133, 157 (1982).
74. 453 A.2d 489 (Me. 1982).
75. In Oliver, tried before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, the court found the warrantless search of Petitioner's fenced and posted property
was not a violation of the fourth amendment rights. Yet in Thornton, heard before the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the court held that entry by government agents onto
defendant's fenced and posted land was a violation of his fourth amendment rights.
10
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pectation of privacy.
In United States v. Oliver,76 the defendant, Ray Oliver, was a re-
tired farmer living with his wife and daughter in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky on a two hundred acre farm which he owned.77 Oliver used a
portion of his farm to raise hogs, and the rest he leased to third par-
ties.78 In the summer of 1980, the Kentucky State Police received an
anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown on Oliver's farm.7 9
Without attempting to secure a search warrant or to obtain Oliver's
consent, the police proceeded to the farm to investigate.80 They drove
down Oliver's private road past several "No Trespassing" signs, until a
locked gate blocked their path.8 At this point the agents abandoned
their car and slipped through a gap in the gate on a path clearly
marked with a "No Trespassing" sign."' The narcotics agents pro-
ceeded to walk three-quarters of a mile down the road and past a barn
and truck camper. After the police had walked approximately one
quarter of a mile beyond the barn and camper, a man appeared near
the camper and requested the agents to turn around and come back.
The officers stated that they were Kentucky State Police and did in fact
begin to walk back toward the camper. However, the person who had
requested they leave the property was no longer present.83 The officers
continued with the investigation proceeding through a wooded area un-
til they came upon two fields of marijuana. The fields were located at
the rear of the farm84 in a secluded area surrounded by a natural bar-
rier of trees, banks and fences. 85 The facts clearly indicate that one
could not view these marijuana fields unless he were standing on Oli-
ver's land and had gone to the same trouble to view the fields as the
agents had.86
The government charged Oliver with manufacturing marijuana. 7
76. Oliver, 686 F.2d at 356.
77. Id. at 358.
78. Id. at 361 (Keith, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 358.
80. Id. at 362 (Keith, J., dissenting).




85. Id. at 362 (Keith, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 358. Oliver was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1981) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (1969).
1984]
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The Kentucky District Court found that the state police had violated
Oliver's fourth amendment rights and granted the defendant's motion
to suppress the marijuana evidence. The Sixth Circuit applied Justice
Harlan's two-prong test to determine first, if Oliver exhibited an actual
expectation of privacy, and second, if the expectation was one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Under this standard the
Sixth Circuit court found that Oliver possessed a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy sufficient to require a search warrant. 88 However, on
rehearing the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and found that
any expectation of privacy in an open field is, as a matter of law,
unreasonable.8 9
In State v. Thornton,90 the companion case of Oliver, the Maine
police received an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown on
property located off of the Davis Corner Road.9 The officers proceeded
to the Davis Corner Road and following the directions given by the
informant entered the Thornton property by walking between a mobile
home and an adjacent house until they came upon an "overgrown tote
road."92 The officers continued on this path and discovered two clear-
ings fenced in with chicken wire which contained marijuana. Due to
the density of the woods, it was not possible to see the patches of mari-
Under title 21:
(a) Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to man-
ufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute,
or dispense, a counterfeit substance.
21 U.S.C. § 841 (1981); Under title 18:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly per-
formed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is
punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1969).
88. United States v. Oliver, 657 F.2d 85, 88 (6th Cir. 1981). Circuit Judges
Keith and Lively, and District Judge Rice, sitting in designation, made up the panel in
the original decision.
89. Oliver, 686 F.2d at 360.
90. Thornton, 453 A.2d at 489.
91. Id. at 490.
92. Id.
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juana from any significant distance whatsoever.93 The Thornton prop-
erty was surrounded by an old barbed wire fence, an old stone wall,
and numerous "No Trespassing" signs. The officers left the area once
they determined that the plants were marijuana.94
Three days later the state trooper involved in the initial search of
the Thornton property, filed an affidavit and obtained a warrant to
search the defendant's land.95 The trooper relied on three factors to
substantiate his claim of probable cause: 1) he had seen marijuana
growing on the defendant's land in 1980; 2) his observations from the
warrantless search three days earlier; and 3) the information given by
the anonymous informant.9" A warrant was granted based on the affi-
davit and the trooper returned to the Thornton property and confis-
cated the marijuana. Thornton was subsequently charged with unlaw-
fully furnishing scheduled drugs in violation of state law.97
Thornton moved to suppress both the evidence seized and the ob-
servations of the government agents. The Superior Court of Somerset
County granted the order to suppress upon finding: 1) that the District
Attorney had abandoned any attempt to prove the informant's tip justi-
fied the issuance of the warrant; 2) that the information gathered in the
state trooper's 1980 search was stale and possibly obtained during an
unlawful search; and 3) that the sole remaining ground for substantiat-




96. Id. at 491.
97. Id. at 490. Thornton was charged with unlawfully furnishing scheduled drugs
which is a violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1106. That section provides:
1. A person is guilty of unlawfully furnishing scheduled drugs if he inten-
tionally or knowingly furnishes what he knows or believes to be a sched-
uled drug, and which is, in fact, a scheduled drug, unless the conduct
which constitutes such furnishing is either:
A. Expressly authorized by Title 22;
B. Expressly made a civil violation by Title 22.
2. Violation of this section is:
A. A Class C crime if the drug is scheduled W drug; or
B. A Class D crime if the drug is scheduled X, Y, or Z drug.
3. A person shall be presumed to be unlawfully furnishing a scheduled
drug if he intentionally or knowingly possesses more than 1 ounces of
marijuana.
17 A M.R.S. A. § 1106 (1983).
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state trooper.98 According to the trial judge, the central issue was
whether the initial warrantless search of the police qualified as an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement. Taking into consideration the na-
ture of the land searched, that it was secluded, had been fenced in and
that signs were posted, the court concluded that Thornton had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and that the initial search was unlaw-
ful.99 The Maine Supreme Court affirmed, upholding the trial court's
determination that the initial search violated Thornton's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy and that the open fields doctrine did not apply.100
Consequently, the evidence obtained in Thornton constituted the
fruit of an unlawful search and seizure and, therefore, was inadmissi-
ble. However, in Oliver a contrary decision was reached, allowing the
evidence to be introduced at trial even though it was obtained under
almost identical circumstances. As stated, both cases used different but
presumptively valid Supreme Court cases to arrive at different results.
It, therefore, became necessary for the Supreme Court to clarify the
fourth amendment standard for search and seizures in the open fields.
V. Analysis of Case
Because the Court consolidated the cases of Oliver v. United
States'' and State v. Thornton0 2 this comment will also focus on the
issues raised by these cases as though they were one. The Court in
Oliver concluded that fourth amendment protection does not extend to
posted and fenced fields which clearly manifest the property owner's
expectation of privacy. 0 3 In reaching this decision, the Court first de-
clared that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend an intrusion
by government agents onto land located beyond the curtilage to be pro-
scribed by the laws against unreasonable search and seizure. 04 Second,
the Court stated that in light of Hester, "an individual may not legiti-
mately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields,
except in the area immediately surrounding the home."'1
In determining whether the defendants had a justifiable expecta-
98. Id. at 491-92.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 495-96.
101. Docket No. 82-15.
102. Docket No. 82-1273.
103. Oliver, -U.S. at-, 104 S. Ct. at 1743.
104. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1740.
105. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
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tion of fourth amendment protection, the Supreme Court specifically
stated that no single factor was to be determinative. 106 Rather, a num-
ber of components were to be considered: 1) the intentions of the Fram-
ers of the Constitution; 2) the use made of the area by the defendants;
and 3) the understanding of society that certain locations requie fas-
tidious protection from government intrusions.'07
The Court reasoned that the Framers' substitution of the word
"effects" in place of "property," which James Madison had in his pro-
posed draft of the fourth amendment, is evidence of their intent to limit
the protection of the fourth amendment to personal rather than real
property. 0 8 Therefore, the Court concluded, "the government's intru-
sion upon the open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable searches'
proscribed by the text of the fourth amendment." 09 This narrow inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment is sharply divergent from the path
taken in past Supreme Court decisions. For example, this new interpre-
tation of the Framers' intent is inconsistent in light of the Court's hold-
ing in Katz" 0 that a conversation in a public phone booth is worthy of
fourth amendment protection; as well as with the Court's holding in
Marshall"' that an office or commercial establishment, that excluded
the public, is protected from warrantless searches. It is also at odds
with the Court's prior attitude toward constitutional interpretation as
demonstrated in the cases of Boyd v. United States"2 and Weems v.
United States."13
Cases such as Boyd represent the method of constitutional inter-
pretation utilized to guard values traditionally deemed worthy of the
Supreme Court's protection. In Boyd, Justice Bradley warned that a
strict construction of the fourth amendment will result in a gradual loss
of the personal rights the amendment was created to protect."14 Clauses
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at -, at 1740.
109. Id.
110. 389 U.S. 347.
111. 436 U.S. at 310.
112. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616.
113. 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
114. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provi-
sions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed.
A close and literal construction of them deprives them of half their efficacy
and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in
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designed to protect the individual from governmental abuses of power,
were also the focus of the Court's attention in Weems v. United States.
Justice McKenna emphasized that it is better to read the Constitution
liberally, for although a particular wrong might have inspired the crea-
tion of an amendment, in order for the underlying principle to remain
vital it "must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth.""" In the dissent in Oliver, Justice Marshall's style of
Constitutional interpretation is in harmony with that employed by Jus-
tice Bradley in Boyd and Justice McKenna in Weems. In Oliver Justice
Marshall stated that "[t]he fourth amendment, like the other central
provisions of the Bill of Rights that loom large in our modern jurispru-
dence, was designed, not to prescribe with 'precision' permissible and
impermissible activities, but to identify a fundamental human liberty
that should be shielded forever from governmental intrusion." '116 Only
if the Constitution is liberally construed to allow the courts to effectu-
ate the purposes of the Framers, will our individual liberties be
protected.
Although the Supreme Court purported to use the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test, in effect the Oliver Court injected a threshold
question into the second prong of Justice Harlan's test: "whether the
government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the fourth amendment?" By determining that the Fram-
ers never intended that fourth amendment protection should extend to
the area beyond the curtilage, the Court did not need to proceed any
further with an examination of Justice Harlan's test. For once the
Court decided that the Framers would not accept the defendants' ex-
pectation of privacy in an open field as reasonable, it followed that soci-
ety, too, was not prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy as
reasonable, which was not based on a right protected by the Constitu-
tion. Although it appears that the Oliver Court is using a fresh ap-
sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and guard against any stealthy en-
croachments thereon.
115. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. There-
fore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.
116. Oliver, -U.S.-, 104 S. Ct. at 1745 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 9
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss1/9
Oliver v. United States
proach it was actually in Olmstead that the Supreme Court first de-
clared that certain areas were to be considered "constitutionally
protected." Both Courts based their .decisions upon a literal construc-
tion of the fourth amendment and determined that unless a search and
seizure took place within those specified areas, the fourth amendment
did not apply.
Arguably, the decision by the Court in Oliver, is a retreat back to
the period of constitutional interpretation which existed prior to Katz.
Although Katz overruled the Olmstead "constitutionally protected ar-
eas" method for application of fourth amendment protection, the Oliver
decision appears to draw once again upon that antiquated locational
approach. By ruling that constitutional prohibitions forbidding war-
rantless searches and seizures do not apply to specific areas, i.e. open
fields, no matter what the individuals subjective expectation of privacy
might be, the Court appears to be utilizing pre-Katz analysis. Regard-
less of the approach taken, a direct result of the Court's decision in
Oliver is that police officers will no longer be required to prove proba-
ble cause to an impartial magistrate before conducting a "search" of
that portion of a citizen's property which lies beyond the curtilage. Far
from carrying out the intentions of the Framers, the Court's narrow
interpretation of the fourth amendment actually impedes protection of
the fundamental values which it was designed to safeguard.
Additional factors examined by the Court include: the use made of
the areas by Oliver and Thornton, and whether society requires fastidi-
ous protection from government intrusion of clearly marked privately
owned property.117 As an example of a use which has historically re-
ceived fastidious fourth amendment protection, the Court discussed the
"sanctity of the home.""' 8 Writing for the majority in Oliver Justice
Powell contrasted activities which take place in the home with those
that occur in open fields, and concluded that the level of intimacy for
activities in open fields was insufficent to warrant "an expectation [of
privacy] that 'society recognizes as reasonable.' "1119 Three reasons were
given by the Court for reaching this conclusion: 1) "open fields are
accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, office, or
commercial structure would not be,"'120 2) posting and fencing "do not
117. Oliver, -U.S., 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
118. Id.
119. Id. The cultivation of crops was an example, given by Justice Powell, of
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effectively bar the public from viewing open fields,"' 21 and 3) "the pub-
lic and police lawfully may survey land from the air."' 22
Arguably, in making the determination that any expectation of
privacy a landowner might have in an open field is per se unreasonable,
the Oliver Court did not fully utilize the test as outlined in Katz. Ac-
cording to Justice Harlan's test as outlined in Katz, the inquiry should
have been whether the defendants had a reasonable (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy which society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. 2 '
Although the premise that only property interests limit the power
of the government to conduct warrantless searches has been rejected by
the Court,2 4 common-law property concepts are still relied on to help
determine whether the expectation of privacy in the area in question is
reasonable.' 25 As Justice Powell observed in his concurrence in Rakas
v. Illinois, "property rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a
person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas, and therefore
should be considered in determining whether an individual's expecta-
tions of privacy are reasonable."'1 2 6 Accordingly, the common law has
long recognized the right to exclude others as an incident of property
ownership.12 7 It is this right to exclude which creates a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy.' 28
The steps taken by both Thornton and Oliver to exclude the public
from their land clearly manifest a subjective expectation of privacy. It
was not possible to see either field from any direction of public access.
Nor was it the government's contention that the police had probable
cause for the warrantless search, or that exigent circumstances existed
which would have done away with the warrant requirement. 129 The
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 353.
125. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 at 143, 144 n.12 (1978) (Powell,
J., concurring): ("the Court has not altogether abandoned the use of property concepts
in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interest protected by [the
Fourth] Amendment"); and Marshall, 436 U.S. at 312 (1978) ("if the government
intrudes [upon] a person's property, the privacy interest suffers .....
126. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153.
127. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATC Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982) ("The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most trea-
sured strands in the owner's bundle of property rights").
128. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153.
129. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1738 n.1.
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Court in Katz found the warrant requirement a necessary safeguard to
assure that an impartial tribunal determines whether there is probable
cause to issue a search warrant.130 A warrantless search is justified only
under the strict guidelines established as exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement. The five basic exceptions' include: incident to a lawful ar-
rest;132 probable cause and exigent circumstances; 133 suspect consents
to the search; 34 hot pursuit; 35 and stop and frisk.' 36 These exceptions
apply where the general welfare of society, balanced against the indi-
vidual's privacy interest, warrant government action. It was clearly es-
tablished in Katz, that searches which are conducted without the prior
approval of a magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the fourth
amendment.'37
In the lower courts, resolution of the inquiry as to whether a war-
rantless search was justified according to the open fields doctrine in-
volved an objective appraisal of surrounding circumstances, in particu-
lar the existence of gates, signs, fences, and locks.' 8 The fact that both
Oliver and Thornton owned the land lends additional credence to their
assertion of a justifiable expectation of privacy. It is also important to
note that in both Kentucky and Maine, violation of the property rights
130. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. The purpose of the fourth amendment's warrant
requirement is to protect citizens from arbitrary intrusion by the government into their
private domain.
131. The "plain view" doctrine allows the police to seize evidence, in plain view,
and inadvertently seen in the course of a lawful search in regard to another crime. See,
e.g., Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1970); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730
(1982).
132. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979).
133. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1979).
134. Schnickloth v. Bustomonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
135. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
136. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
137. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
138. Compare, e.g., United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46 (2nd Cir. 1982) (held a
warrantless search was justified because the property was not posted and the public
could enter at will), United States v. Balsamo, 468 F. Supp. 1363, 1379 (D. Me. 1979)
(search justified because the land was not posted or fenced), and United States v.
Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, (1st Cir. 1978) (warrantless search allowed since outsiders
could enter at will); with United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982)
(fenced property is protected), vacated -_U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984) and State
v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1981) (property protected where posted and fenced),
cert. granted, 456 U.S. 988 (1982), cert. dismissed in part, vacated in part -U.S.-,
104 S. Ct. 2380 (1984).
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of others is considered a criminal offense.' 3 9 In determining whether a
defendant's asserted privacy expectations were justifiable, the Supreme
Court, prior to the Oliver decision, inquired as to whether the defen-
dant "took normal precautions to maintain his privacy. ' 140 If such pre-
cautions were taken by the defendant, the Court usually determined
that without a warrant a government official was in no better position
than any other member of the public.' 4 ' In Oliver, had a private citizen
entered the property concerned, he would clearly have been trespassing
and therefore committing a criminal offense.
The Court in Oliver makes it clear that violations of a citizen's
property interest by a government agent will not, in and of itself, create
a fourth amendment problem. Although the majority does not specifi-
cally address the issue of criminal trespass, that the Court is unwilling
to suppress the evidence means, in essence, that the only remaining
remedy for the defendants is to sue the officers for trespass. Needless to
say this remedy falls short of being of any real assistance to either
Oliver or Thornton. Ultimately the only remedy that truly counts is
application of the exclusionary rule.
Apparently the approach, developed in Marshall,'42 has now been
rejected by the Court. In Oliver, the Court supported its decision that a
trespass by a government agent upon an open field is not necessarily a
violation of the fourth amendment, stating that Katz determined that
property interests do not control the right of the government to search
and seizure.'4 3 It is important to note, that the purpose behind Katz in
discarding the Olmstead "constitutionally protected areas" approach,
was to shift the focus away from the place being intruded upon by
government officials and to place it on the person being subjected to the
warrantless search. Presumably, the objective of the Court in Katz, was
to increase the size of the fourth amendment umbrella and thereby
broaden constitutional protection.
The third rationale offered by the Oliver Court to show that the
defendants' expectation of privacy was unreasonable, was that aerial
surveillance could have been used to gather sufficient evidence to obtain
139. Ky. REv. STAT. § 511.070(1), .080, (1975 & 1984); and ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 17A, § 402(1)(c) (1983).
140. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980).
141. Marshall, 436 U.S. at 315.
142. Id.
143. Oliver, -U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. at 1743.
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a search warrant or to justify a warrantless search.'" The utilization of
sophisticated technology which makes this type of wide-ranging, arbi-
trary search for crime possible, threatens the basic constitutional right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizures.' 4" As one writer
stated, "U]udicial implementations of the fourth amendment need con-
stant accomodation to the ever-intensifying technology of surveil-
lance."'14 6 The cases of Olmstead and Katz demonstrate that there are
times when fourth amendment interpretation has lagged behind rapidly
developing technologies of surveillance, and thus newer techniques
which invade privacy may go temporarily unrecognized as "searches"
and "seizures."'4 7 In this era of ever-increasing surveillance capabili-
ties, care must be taken to ensure that tomorrow's sophisticated surveil-
lance devices, do not go so far as to deprive Americans of the right to
privacy recognized by the Supreme Court as existing within the "sanc-
tity of the home."' 48
VI. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens
dissented in Oliver. These Justices listed three factors traditionally used
to determine whether a person's expectation of privacy in a physical
space is reasonable: 1) whether the defendants' expectation of privacy
was recognized by positive law; 2) the potential uses of the open fields
on defendants' property; and 3) whether the defendants had clearly
manifested to the public, in a manner likely to be understood, their
intent that the land in question was private. 4"
To determine whether the defendants' privacy expectations were
grounded in positive law, the dissent reflected upon the Court's state-
ment in Rakas,150 that one who lawfully possesses property, coupled
144. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
145. Granberg, Is Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Constitutional? 55 CAL. ST.
B.J. 451, 454 (1980).
146. Brief for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Northern Cali-
fornia (ACLU-NC), Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(MALDEF), and California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) in Support of Petitioner,
Oliver, - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1735. But see, Justice Rehnquist's statement in
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1982) for a contrary argument.
147. Id.
148. Oliver, -U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
149. Id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1747 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153.
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with the right to exclude, will probably have a justifiable expectation of
privacy. The dissent noted that the defendants could subject an in-
truder to criminal liability, under local law, for violation of their prop-
erty rights.15' Taking into consideration that Oliver and Thornton both
owned the property concerned, the dissenters concluded that the defen-
dants' expectations of privacy were of the type that society has tradi-
tionally accepted as reasonable.'52
The Oliver dissenters speculated upon the numerous ways the de-
fendants could have enjoyed their secluded property which society
would recognize as deserving of privacy. Solitary walks, lovers tryst,
and religious services were but a few of the potential uses to which the
defendants' could have put their property. 153 "Our respect for the free-
dom of the landowners to use their posted 'open fields' in ways such as
these" accounts for the gravity with which the positive law considers
intentional trespass. 5 4
Finally, the dissent explained that it is essential to a strong claim
of privacy to clearly manifest an intent to exclude. Justice Marshall
stated that although a property owner need not execute his right to
exclude the public, if and when he does exercise this entitlement, he
bears the burden of clearly communicating his intention to pass-
ersby. 55 Both positive law and social convention consider undeveloped
land to be open to the public unless the landowner has clearly indicated
a contrary intent.' 56 Justice Marshall concluded that if the property
had been properly fenced and posted, and the intentional intrusion of a
private citizen would expose him to criminal liability, then "[I] see no
reason why a government official should not be obliged to respect such
unequivocal and universally understood manifestations of a landowner's
desire for privacy."' 57
The dissent expressed concern that not only will the Oliver ruling
pave the way for a variety of distasteful investigative activities, but also
that society will gradually become accustomed to law enforcement
agencies routinely engaging in this type of invasive "search."'1 58 The
dissent warns, that even the most repugnant of activities can become
151. Oliver, - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1748.
152. Id.
153. Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1748-49.
154. Id. at -' 104 S. Ct. at 1749.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1750.
158. Id. at _, 104 S. Ct. at 1751.
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common place and thereby lose their power to offend. 159
VII. Effect of the Oliver Decision
Arguably the Oliver decision demonstrates that the Court is shift-
ing away from the protection of civil liberties. Perhaps the govern-
ment's interest in combating crime is replacing its fundamental concern
for personal liberty. Judicial attention appears to reflect society's con-
cern with the rising crime rate. The Court, it appears, is prepared to
sacrifice rights protected by the Constitution in an effort to aid law
enforcement personnel in apprehending and prosecuting criminal sus-
pects. No longer does the Court place a higher value on guarding per-
sonal rights than on detecting criminals. Justice Holmes, once faced
with a decision similar to the Court in Oliver, said "[w]e have to
choose, and for my part I think it is a less evil that soie criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part."160
If the pendulum continues to swing in this direction, and the
courts grow increasingly preoccupied with "fighting" crime, there is yet
another danger threatening the preservation of our fourth amendment
rights. Professor Amsterdam warns that the danger of requiring an ac-
tual expectation of privacy is that the government could conceivably
manipulate the public's expectations so that no legitimate subjective
expectation could exist."" In effect the Oliver Court determined, using
the objective standard as defined in the second prong of Justice
Harlan's test, that society would not recognize the defendant's expecta-
tion of privacy in an open field as reasonable. Although the Court
grounded the Oliver decision on the objective prong of Justice Harlan's
test, Professor Amsterdam points out that the subjective prong can also
be used as a device to limit fourth amendment protection. 2 In his ex-
amination of Justice Harlan's two-pronged test Professor Amsterdam
focuses upon the potential for governmental abuse.'6 3 To reiterate, Jus-
tice Harlan required the Court to determine whether the defendant
possessed an expectation of privacy and whether this expectation was
159. Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 1751, n.21.
160. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470.
161. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 384 (1974).
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one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."" As noted by
another commentator, "each element of Justice Harlan's test, if taken
to its logical extreme, might eliminate the right to have expectations of
freedom from governmental intrusions, thereby nullifying the safe-
guards of the fourth amendment."' 16 5 In Oliver, for example, the Court
determined that an individual can not possess a justifiable expectation
that open fields will be free from warrantless intrusion by agents of the
government. 166 If the government of the United States "can condition
citizens to expect that certain intrusive searches and seizures will oc-
cur, then those searches and seizures, by definition, would not be un-
reasonable.' 1 67 Therefore, regardless of the measures taken by an indi-
vidual, i.e. electric fencing, posting, ten foot high brick walls etc., no
action will be deemed sufficient to create a reasonable subjective expec-
tation of privacy in property which lies outside the curtilage.
Arguably, by defining the open fields doctrine in this manner, the
Oliver Court has reduced the protection of personal privacy tradition-
ally guarded by the fourth amendment. Indeed, there is little doubt
that by concluding that any expectation of privacy an individual might
have in an open field is per se unreasonable, the Court has removed
numerous barriers from the path of law enforcement personnel. By
eliminating the necessity of obtaining a warrant, the police are no
longer required to convince an impartial magistrate of sufficient proba-
ble cause before beginning a search of that portion of a citizen's prop-
erty, considered by the police to be an open field. Therefore, the police
are free to conduct arbitrary, persistent, and indiscriminate searches on
private property in an effort to discover criminal activity. In essence,
the Oliver decision marks a return to a pre-Katz approach to fourth
amendment analysis. By determining that constitutional protection
from warrantless searches and seizures does not apply, as a matter of
law, to open fields, regardless of the individual's subjective expectation
of privacy, the Court has apparently returned to the once disfavored
locational approach of Olmstead.
The Court justified its decision in Oliver by claiming that an ad
hoc case-by-case determination of whether or not a defendant possessed
a reasonable expectation of privacy was not a workable solution to an-
164. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
165. Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76
MICH. L. REv. 154, 157-58 (1977).
166. Oliver, - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
167. Note, supra note 168, at 157-58.
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swer the needs of law enforcement. 16 8 Yet the dissent offered a solution
which is not only workable and can easily be applied, but which contin-
ues to offer protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The
dissent suggested that "[p]rivate land marked in a fashion sufficient to
render entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the state in
which the land lies is protected by the Fourth Amendment's proscrip-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizures."' 69
The Court in Oliver held that, "[t]he test of legitimacy is not
whether the individual chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity.
Rather, the correct inquiry is whether the government's intrusion in-
fringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment.' 170 This is an excellent question posited by the Court but
never satisfactorily answered. Constitutional interpretation is the
method the Supreme Court uses to discover which values the Framers
intended to protect by the creation of the fourth amendment. The Oli-
ver Court chose a close and literal interpretation of the language in the
fourth amendment. Judicial history, however, demonstrates what past
Supreme Courts have considered values protected by the fourth amend-
ment.' 7 ' In Boyd Justice Bradley, in his discussion of the fundamental
principles of constitutional liberty, stated, "[i]t is not the breaking of
his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the es-
sence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefensible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property .... ,172 Jus-
tice Brandeis, in his well known dissent in Olmstead, stated that the
Framers of the Constitution "sought to protect Americans in their be-
liefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They con-
ferred, as against the government, the right to be left alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."' 73
Even in 1984, Orwellian projections of doom' 74 can still be kept at
bay. By remembering Justice Frankfurter's graceful phrase, "[t]he
course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has not...
168. Oliver, - U.S. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 1743.
169. Id. at 1750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1743.
171. Id.
172. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. Justice Brandeis called Boyd, "a case that will be
remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States."
173. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
174. Amsterdam, supra note 165, at 384.
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run smooth,"' 75 one can hope that Oliver is but one more bump in the
road.
Vickie Popkin Kligerman
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